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Abstract
The question of which strategy is employed in human decision making has been studied extensively in the context of
cognitive tasks; however, this question has not been investigated systematically in the context of perceptual tasks. The goal
of this study was to gain insight into the decision-making strategy used by human observers in a low-level perceptual task.
Data from more than 100 individuals who participated in an auditory-visual spatial localization task was evaluated to
examine which of three plausible strategies could account for each observer’s behavior the best. This task is very suitable for
exploring this question because it involves an implicit inference about whether the auditory and visual stimuli were caused
by the same object or independent objects, and provides different strategies of how using the inference about causes can
lead to distinctly different spatial estimates and response patterns. For example, employing the commonly used cost
function of minimizing the mean squared error of spatial estimates would result in a weighted averaging of estimates
corresponding to different causal structures. A strategy that would minimize the error in the inferred causal structure would
result in the selection of the most likely causal structure and sticking with it in the subsequent inference of location—
‘‘model selection.’’ A third strategy is one that selects a causal structure in proportion to its probability, thus attempting to
match the probability of the inferred causal structure. This type of probability matching strategy has been reported to be
used by participants predominantly in cognitive tasks. Comparing these three strategies, the behavior of the vast majority of
observers in this perceptual task was most consistent with probability matching. While this appears to be a suboptimal
strategy and hence a surprising choice for the perceptual system to adopt, we discuss potential advantages of such a
strategy for perception.
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Introduction
Human performance in perceptual tasks is often benchmarked
by optimal strategies. An optimal strategy is one that performs best
with respect to its objectives or maximizes expected reward or
equivalently, minimizes a cost function [1,2]. Previous studies have
investigated whether performance in perceptual tasks is consistent
with normative models that use maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) [3–5], Bayesian inference [6–8], signal detection theory
[9–11], or other computational frameworks. These previous
studies either implicitly or explicitly assume a certain cost/utility
function that defines the optimal decision. In contrast, the question
of which utility/cost function is used by the nervous system for
perceptual tasks has not been systematically investigated [but see
12,13].
In this study we aim to computationally characterize human
perceptual decision making strategies. As different strategies may
be used across individuals, we characterize the strategy used by
each individual observer instead of modeling the behavior of an
‘‘average observer’’. We used a spatial localization task, as it is
simple and fundamental to perceptual processing. While spatial
localization has been studied extensively, it has not been
investigated in the context of decision making strategies. In
nature, at any given moment, we are typically exposed to both
visual and auditory stimuli, and scene perception and analysis
requires simultaneous inference about the location of auditory and
visual stimuli (as well as other sensory stimuli such as tactile, and
olfactory). Therefore, multisensory spatial localization represents a
task that the perceptual system is implicitly engaged in at all times.
This task is particularly useful for probing decision-making
strategies because it involves an automatic causal inference about
the sources of stimuli, and distinct patterns of behavior
corresponding to different strategies. For each observer we
examined which of three plausible decision making strategies best
accounts for their performance. We use a Bayesian causal
inference model of multisensory perception [14] to quantify
subjects’ responses as one of three strategies as well as compare
them to qualitative predictions of such strategies.
One strategy tested was the objective of minimizing the mean
squared error. This is a commonly used loss function in normative
models of human behavior [3,4,7,15,16]. It assumes that the
nervous system tries to minimize the squared error on average.
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averaging, i.e., weighted averaging of the estimate derived from two
different causal structures [14]: a common cause hypothesis and
an independent causal hypothesis, each weighted by their
respective probability (see Figure 1c).
Another strategy we tested was to minimize the error in the
inferred causal structure as well as the error in the spatial estimate.
This strategy in the context of our task translates into model selection
[17,18]. This strategy also maximizes the consistency in the
inference process [13]. In our task, model selection maximizes
consistency between the causal structure chosen and the estimate
of location. In this strategy, the estimate of location is purely based
on the causal structure that is deemed to be most likely (see
Figure 1d).
The third strategy tested is probability matching [19–22]. This
strategy has been reported to be used by humans in a variety of
cognitive tasks. In these tasks, probability matching refers to the
phenomenon in which observer’s probability of a given response
matches the probability of appearance of the given target. For
example, if the task is to predict which one of two colored lights
will be presented in each trial, in an experiment in which each
color is presented with a certain probability, then the participant’s
frequency of predicting each color will be consistent with the
relative frequency of the presentation of the color. For a situation
where a green light is presented 70% of the time, and a blue light
30% of the time, probability matching behavior would predict the
green light on approximately 70% of trials. This strategy is
considered to be sub-optimal in terms of economic and utility
theory because once it is known that the green light is presented
more often, observers should predict the green light on all trials to
maximize their utility or gain (.70 proportion correct vs.
.706.70+.306.30=.58 proportion correct). Therefore, probability
matching has not received much attention in the study of
perception—which is generally considered to be highly optimized
by evolution [but see 23–25 for evidence in visual selective
attention]. Nonetheless, because of its implication in the decision
making literature, we included this strategy in our analysis. In our
task, this strategy would translate into choosing a causal structure
according to the probability of the underlying causal structure.
Thus, this strategy is one step removed from matching the
probability of response outcomes but rather matches the
probability of the implicit causal structure (see Figure 1e).
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was conducted according to the principles expressed
in the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants in the experiment
provided written informed consent in approval with the UCLA
Institutional Review Board.
Participants, Procedure and Stimuli
One hundred and forty six subjects participated in the
experiment. We used a large sample because we wanted to be
able to detect even small subpopulations (e.g., a small percentage
of observers) who may adopt a different strategy. Participants sat at
a desk in a dimly lit room with their chins positioned on a chin-rest
52 cm from a projection screen. The screen was a black
acoustically transparent cloth subtending much of the visual field
(134u width660u height). Behind the screen were 5 free-field
speakers (568 cm, extended range paper cone), positioned along
azimuth 6.5u apart, 7u below fixation. The middle speaker was
positioned below the fixation point, and two speakers were
position to the right and two to the left of the fixation. The visual
stimuli were presented overhead from a ceiling mounted projector
set to a resolution of 128061024 pixels with a refresh rate of
75 Hz.
The visual stimulus was a white-noise disk (.41 cd/m
2)w i t ha
Gaussian envelope of 1.5u FWHM, presented 7u below the fixation
point on a black background (.07 cd/m
2), for 35 ms. The visual
stimuli were always presented so that their location overlapped the
center of one of the five speakers behind the screen positioned at
213u, 26.5u,0 u,6 . 5 u 13u.A u d i t o r ys t i m u l iw e r er a m p e dw h i t en o i s e
bursts of 35 ms measuring 69 dB(A) sound pressure level at a distance
of 52 cm. The speaker locations were unknown to the participants.
In order to familiarize participants with the task, each session
started with a practice period of 10 randomly interleaved trials in
which only an auditory stimulus was presented at a variable
location, and subjects were asked to report the location of the
auditory stimulus.
Practice was followed by 525 test trials that took about 45 minutes
to complete. 15 repetitions of 35 stimulus conditions were presented
in pseudorandom order. The stimulus conditions included 5
unisensory auditory locations, 5 unisensory visual locations, and all
25 combinations of auditory and visual locations (bisensory
conditions). On bisensory trials, subjects were asked to report both
thelocationofauditorystimulusandthelocationofvisualstimulusin
sequential order. The order of these two responses was consistent
throughout the session, and was counter-balanced across subjects.
Subjects were told that ‘‘the sound and light could come from the
same location, or they could come from different locations.’’ As a
reminder, a blue ‘S’ or green ‘L’ was placed inside the cursor to
remind subjects to respond to the sound or light respectively.
Each trial started with fixation cross, followed after 750–
1100 ms by the presentation of the stimuli. After 450 ms, fixation
was removed and a cursor appeared on the screen vertically just
above the horizontal line where the stimuli were presented and at
a random horizontal location in order to minimize response bias.
The cursor was controlled by a trackball mouse placed in front of
the subject, and could only be moved in the horizontal direction.
Participants were instructed to ‘‘move the cursor as quickly and
accurately as possible to the exact location of the stimulus and click
Author Summary
For any task, the utility function specifies the goal to be
achieved. For example, in taking a multiple-choice test, the
utility is the total number of correct answers. An optimal
decision strategy for a task is one that maximizes the
utility. Because the utility functions and decision strategies
used in perception have not been empirically investigated,
it remains unclear what decision-making strategy is used,
and whether the choice of strategy is uniform across
individuals and tasks. In this study, we computationally
characterize a decision-making strategy for each individual
participant in an auditory-visual spatial localization task,
where participants need to make implicit inferences about
whether or not the auditory and visual stimuli were caused
by the same or independent objects. Our results suggest
that a) there is variability across individuals in decision
strategy, and b) the majority of participants appear to
adopt a probability matching strategy that chooses a value
according to the inferred probability of that value. These
results are surprising, because perception is believed to be
highly optimized by evolution, and the probability
matching strategy is considered ‘‘suboptimal’’ under the
commonly assumed utility functions. However, we note
that this strategy is preferred (or may be even optimal)
under utility functions that value learning.
Probability Matching as a Perceptual Strategy
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with a resolution of 0.1 degree/pixel.
Causal Inference Model
We used a Bayesian causal inference model of multisensory
perception augmented with one of the three decision strategies
described above to classify the decision making strategy used by
each participant. Details of the model can be found elsewhere [14],
but in summary, each stimulus or event, s, in the world causes an
underlying noisy sensory estimate, xi, of the event (where i is
indexed over sensorychannels). Similar to [14],the sensory estimate
for our task is the perceived location of the auditory and visual
stimuli. We use a generative model to simulate experimental trials
and subject responses by performing 10,000 Monte Carlo
simulations per condition. Each individual sensation is modeled
using the likelihood function p(xiDs). Trial-to-trial variability is
introduced by sampling the likelihood from a normal distribution
around the true sensory location, analogous to having auditory and
visual sensory channels corrupted by independent Gaussian noise
with parameters sA and sV respectively. We assume there is a prior
bias for the central location, as modeled by a Gaussian distribution
centered at 0u. Thestrength of this bias,sP, is a free parameter.The
causal inference model infers the underlying causal structure, C,o f
the environment based on the available sensory evidence and prior
knowledge using Bayes’ rule shown in Equation 1.
p(CDxV,xA)~
p(xV,xADC)p(C)
p(xV,xA)
ð1Þ
Figure 1 shows a schematic example for a bimodal stimulus
presentation. The competing causal structures are shown in
Figure 1-B, where either the sensations could arise from a common
cause (C=1, Figure 1-B left), or from independent causes (C=2,
Figure 1-B right). The optimal estimates for the visual and auditory
locations are given in Equation 2 for the common cause model, and
Equation 3 for the independent model.
^ s sA, C~1~^ s sV, C~1~
xA
s2
A
z
xV
s2
V
z
mP
s2
P
1
s2
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z
1
s2
V
z
1
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P
ð2Þ
Figure 1. Illustration of the three different decision strategies for producing an auditory estimate of location. (A) A schematic example
of sensory representations on a trial with a certain discrepancy between the auditory and visual stimuli. The lightbulb and speaker symbols represent
the visual and auditory stimulus locations, respectively. The visual and auditory likelihoods are shown in magenta and blue, respectively. For the sake
of simplicity, here we assume that the prior distribution is non-informative (uniform). Therefore, in the case of a common cause (C=1), i.e., when the
two sensory signals are fused to obtain an estimate, a single Gaussian posterior distribution is obtained which is shown in black. The estimate of the
location of sound,^ s sA is the mean of the black distribution. In contrast, in the independent cause scenario (C=2), this estimate is the mean of the blue
distribution. (B) The generative model for the causal inference model. C=1: One cause can be responsible for both visual and auditory signals, xV and
xA. C=2: Alternatively, two independent causes may generate the visual and auditory cues. The probability of each causal structure can be computed
using Bayes’ Rule (see Eq. 1). Hypothetical posterior probabilities for the stimuli in (A) are given at the bottom of each causal structure. For model
averaging (C), the final auditory estimate would be a weighted average of the two estimates, with each estimate weighted by the probability of its
causal structure. For model selection (D), an estimate is derived based on the most probable model, in this case the independent model (C=2). For
probability matching (E), the final auditory estimate in this example would be equal to the independent model estimate (C=2) 70% of the time, and
equal to the common cause model estimate (C=1) 30% of the time. Visual estimates are produced likewise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871.g001
Probability Matching as a Perceptual Strategy
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The difference in our modeling compared to [14] is in producing
the final spatial location estimates. The goal of the nervous system is
to come up with the best estimates of stimulus locations,^ s sA and ^ s sV.
If the objective is to minimize mean squared error of the spatial
estimates, then the optimal estimates are obtained by model
averaging:
^ s sA~p(C~1DxV,xA)^ s sA, C~1z(1{p(C~1DxV,xA))^ s sA, C~2
^ s sV~p(C~1DxV,xA)^ s sV, C~1z(1{p(C~1DxV,xA))^ s sV, C~2
ð4Þ
where ^ s sA, C~1 is the optimal estimate of auditory location given
there is a single cause (Eq. 2), and^ s sA, C~2 is the optimal estimate of
auditory location given there are independent causes (Eq. 3) (see
Figure 1-A). The final estimate ^ s sA is a weighted average of the two
estimates each weighted by the posterior probability of the
respective causal structure (Figure 1-C). ^ s sV is computed likewise.
In model selection strategy (Figure 1-D), on each trial, the
location estimate is based purely on the causal structure that is
more probable given the sensory evidence and prior bias about the
two causal structures:
^ s sA~
^ s sA, C~1 if p(C~1DxV,xA)w:5
^ s sA, C~2 if p(C~1DxV,xA)~v:5
 
ð5Þ
For probability matching (Figure 1-E), location estimates are based
on selecting a causal structure based on the inferred posterior
probability of the structure. In other words, the selection criterion
is stochastic and no longer deterministic. This can be achieved by
using a variable selection criteria, j, that is sampled from a
uniform distribution on each trial.
^ s sA~
^ s sA, C~1 if p(C~1jxV,xA)wj
where j [ ½0 : 1  uniform distribution
^ s sA, C~2 if p(C~1jxV,xA)~vj
and sampled on each trial
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð6Þ
All three models described above have four free parameters: the
standard deviation of the auditory and visual likelihoods sA and
sV, the standard deviation of the prior over space, sP, and the
prior probability of a common cause, p(C=1)=pcommon. We fit
subject responses to the causal inference model for each of the
three strategies and determine the best strategy based on the
maximum likelihood fit for each subject (see Supplementary Text
S1 for a detailed description of the fitting procedure).
The three decision strategies produce distinct patterns of
responses across trials and stimulus conditions. Figure 2 shows
response distributions for each of the three strategies generated by
Monte Carlo simulations for a few stimulus conditions. For these
simulations, we used parameter values that are typically found
when fitting human observers data. Because vision has a much
higher precision in this task than hearing, visual estimates are not
affected much by sound. Therefore, we focus our attention on the
auditory responses shown in blue. In general, the model averaging
strategy mostly has unimodal response distributions, and in
conditions with moderate conflict between the visual and auditory
Figure 2. Simulated response patterns. Simulated response distributions for the three strategies: model averaging (A), model selection (B), and
probability matching (C). Distributions are created from 10,000 samples per condition, using mean subject parameters [sV=2.5u sA=10.1u sP=33.0u
pcommon=0.57], and only changing the decision strategy. Five bimodal conditions are shown for each strategy with the visual stimulus to the far
left, and the auditory stimulus growing in discrepancy from the left to the right columns. Vertical blue and magenta dotted lines along with the
speaker and lightbulb icons show the true location of the auditory and visual locations, respectively. The predicted log-probability of response is
shown by the shaded bars for both the visual (magenta) and auditory (blue) response distributions, with overlaps shown in a darker shade of blue.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871.g002
Probability Matching as a Perceptual Strategy
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visual stimulus (Figure 2-A). In contrast, for the model selection
strategy, the auditory responses are mostly bimodal and consistent
with either unisensory auditory responses, or complete fusion of
the stimuli (Figure 2-B). The probability mass around each peak
varies consistently with the expected probability of each causal
structure. In other words, for conditions in which the discrepancy
between visual and auditory locations is large, and thus the
probability of a common cause is low, there is a large probability
mass at the auditory location, and in conditions where the conflict
is small, and thus the probability of common cause is high, there is
a much larger probability mass around the visual capture location
(i.e., location shifted towards visual stimulus). The fixed selection
criterion results in distinct separation between the two auditory
response distribution modes. For any probability of a common
cause greater 0.5, the auditory response will be fused with the
visual response. Similarly, the probability matching strategy also
shows bimodal auditory response distributions (Figure 2-C).
However, in contrast with model selection, the modes are not as
distinct. Due to the variable model selection criteria (j), even when
the probability of a common cause is high, there is a small
probability of providing an auditory response consistent with the
independent causal structure. Due to the high uncertainty in the
auditory signals (i.e., large variance of auditory likelihood), this can
even be observed when the stimulus locations are identical (left
column).
Results
For each participant, each of the decision strategy models was
fitted to the data, and the observer was classified by the strategy
that explained the data best. In order to be highly confident in the
classifications, for an observer to be included in the sample we
required that the log-likelihood difference between the best-fitting
model and the second best-fitting model exceed a value of 3—
which is considered substantial evidence for the support of one
model vs. another [26]. In Table 1, we report the results from 110
participants whose data met this criterion. Among these
participants, on average the log-likelihood difference between
the top two best-fitting models was 24.6 (median 17.6), which is in
the range considered as decisive evidence for a model relative to
another model [26]. On average, the best fitting model accounted
for 83% of the variance in the individual participant’s data
(generalized coefficient of determination [27]: R
2=0.8360.11).
The model fits for the probability-matching group data is also
shown for all stimulus conditions in Supplementary Figure S1.
Therefore, the best-fitting model fitted the data very well, and the
classifications were highly reliable.
The number of participants classified as utilizing the matching,
selection, or averaging strategy is provided in Table 1. Probability
matching is the decision strategy used by the vast majority of
observers (82/110). Model averaging was second followed by
model selection. The proportion of males and females is not
significantly different for each strategy (two-sample test for equality
of proportions, p.0.05). The difference in distribution of ages
among the three groups was also statistically insignificant (two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p.0.05). It should be pointed
out that these results are not sensitive to the subject exclusion
criterion described above. The results remain qualitatively the
same even if we do not exclude any participants at all: N=146,
matching=64%; selection=18%; averaging=18%, or if we use
other exclusion criteria (e.g., margin of 10 instead of 3: N=82,
matching=79%; selection=5%; averaging=16%).
We also tested whether the model selection strategy could
explain the data better than the other two strategies if we allow a
bias in choosing a model (i.e., if the criterion can take on any value
as a free parameter, rather than fixed at .5 as in Equation 5).
Despite the additional free parameter for this model, we find
similar proportions of categorization: N=110, matching=72%;
selection=13%; averaging=15% – and after applying Bayesian
Information Criteria regularization for the additional free
parameter: matching=72%; selection=11%; averaging=17%.
Discussion
We aimed to gain insight into the decision making strategy used
in a perceptual task, by comparing three strategies and testing
which one accounts best for the observers’ data. Our computa-
tional modeling tools allow us to perform this type of analysis for
each individual observer. Perceptual functions, in particular the
basic ones that are shared across species (and arguably key to the
survival of the organism) such as spatial localization, are often
thought to be optimal. Perceptual functions are evolutionarily old
and thus, it is argued that there has been sufficient amount of time
for them to have been optimized by evolution [28], and indeed
several studies have shown a variety of perceptual tasks to be
‘‘statistically optimal.’’ For the same reason, it is also expected that
the optimized and automated perceptual processes to be largely
uniform across individuals.
We examined the decision strategies in an auditory-visual
spatial localization task on a large sample of observers consisting of
110 individuals. First, we found that not all observers appear to
utilize the same strategy. This variability across individuals
suggests that this localization process is not predestined or hard-
wired in the nervous system. More importantly, the vast majority
of participants seem to use a probability matching strategy. This
finding is surprising because this strategy is not statistically optimal
in the conventional sense.
Why should the majority of individuals use a ‘‘suboptimal’’
strategy in this basic task? To address this question, it is best to step
back and re-examine the notion of optimality. While a probability
matching strategy may not be optimal in a static environment, it
may be optimal or close to optimal in a dynamic one [29], and
especially useful in exploring patterns in the environment.
Humans instinctively have the tendency to search for regularities
in random patterns [30–33], and it has been suggested that
probability matching results from the addition of an ‘‘informatic’’
utility that considers learning and exploring an important
component in survival and ecological rationality [34]. Thus, while
probability-matchers might look irrational in the absence of
predictable patterns, they would have a higher chance of finding
patterns if they exist [19]. In the context of our experiment,
although the stimuli were uniformly random, perhaps the
matchers subconsciously explore for patterns within the stimuli.
The observed probability matching behavior suggests that the
nervous system samples from a distribution over model hypotheses on
Table 1. Summary of participant strategy classification.
All subjects Females Males Age (m±SD)
Matching 82 (75%) 57 (75%) 25 (74%) 20.963.0
Selection 10 (9%) 7 (9%) 3 (9%) 20.462.1
Averaging 18 (16%) 12 (16%) 6 (17%) 21.563.3
Total 110 76 34 20.963.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871.t001
Probability Matching as a Perceptual Strategy
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proposed to account for neurophysiological phenomena such as
spontaneous neural activity [35] and variability in neural responses
[36], as well as other stochastic perceptual phenomena such as
bistability [37,38]. Alternatively, it is conceivable that a case-based
selection rule [39] that, on each trial, chooses the most appropriate
model from an earlier experience (not necessarily from the current
experiment) resembling the current sensations, would produce this
behavior.
While probability matching was the modal response strategy
found in the current study, we are not claiming that probability
matching is used in all perceptual tasks, or even in all spatial tasks.
Optimal performance in perceptual tasks has been reported by
some previous studies. A recent study found observers’ behavior to
be consistent with the expected loss function in a visual
discrimination task [40], however, the results are ambiguous with
respect to the specific decision making strategy utilized (averaging,
selection, and probability matching) as they would make similar
predictions. Knill, in a study of perception of slant from
compression and binocular disparity cues [41], reported optimal
performance. In this study, which used an almost identical
structure inference model to the one used here, observers’
responses were explained well by model averaging. However,
probability matching was not considered, and regarding model
selection vs. averaging, the author points out that determining
exactly which strategy was used by the participants is difficult.
Perhaps most relevant to our current findings is a previous study of
auditory-visual spatial localization in which the observers’
performance was found to be consistent with model averaging
[14]. Although model selection and probability matching were not
tested, the response profiles were unimodal and thus, inconsistent
with these strategies. The sample size was relatively small in this
study (N=19), yet together with the aforementioned studies, these
findings raise the question of what are the factors that influence the
decision-making strategy adopted by observers. It is likely that the
specific strategy used by participants depends on the context,
instruction, prior experience, and many other factors [42]. Landy
et al. [43] found that stimulus variability and unpredictability from
trial to trial can result in adoption of a variety of suboptimal
strategies by participants in a texture orientation perception task.
Even for a given context, stimuli, and instruction (as in this
experiment), some subjects’ construal of the task may affect their
utility/cost function. The specific computational constraints such
as criteria of speed and accuracy could also favor the use of one
strategy over another. Also in our study, subjects had to make
sequential reports of both modalities requiring responses to be held
in working memory, which has been suggested to have a role in
the decision process [19,32,44]. The specific factors influencing
perceptual decision making strategies is an open question for
future studies.
Probability matching has been shown to happen when people’s
response probability matches the relative frequency of the
presented stimuli. Here we show that the nervous system can
even match the probability of a more abstract construct such as the
probability of causal structure of the stimuli which is one step
removed from the stimuli themselves. This finding suggests that
probability matching may be a general decision-making strategy
operating at multiple levels of processing. The results of this study
altogether suggest that the nervous system does not necessarily use
the commonly assumed least squared error cost function in
perceptual tasks, and underscore the importance of considering
alterative objectives when evaluating perceptual performance.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Model fitting and goodness of fit procedure.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871.s001 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 Model fits to probability matching group. Shaded
areas show the log-probability of response for the 82 subjects
classified as using a probability matching strategy. Thick lines
show the model fits averaged across individual subject fits. Vertical
blue and magenta dotted lines show the location of the auditory
and visual stimulus, respectively. The first row shows the five
unimodal auditory conditions, ordered from leftmost to rightmost
positions along the azimuth as shown by the blue vertical dotted
line. The first column shows the five unimodal visual conditions,
ordered from leftmost (top) to rightmost (bottom) as shown by the
magenta vertical dotted line. The central 25 plots show data from
the bisensory conditions with both the visual (magenta) and
auditory (blue) response distributions.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871.s002 (2.70 MB TIF)
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